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1. Introduction
The beginning of the eighties in The Netherlands showed a university
system largely engaged in recuperating from the many shocks it had ex-
perienced since the late sixties. The number of students and faculty
members had grown dramatically, the formal organization had changed
completely and the various groups in the new formal organization were
learning to play the game of university politics.
It all started with a movement for internal and external democracy at
tYie universities. Internally, groups of students, faculty and staff
claimed a say in almost all university matters, which was up to then only
reserved for the full professors. Externally, there was a movement for
university education for a larger part of the population and for societal
control of academic research. The movement for internal democracy led to a
new formal structure in which the power was shifted from the full profes-
sors to councils in which the various groups could elect their
representatives. The movement for external democracy led to a rapid growth
in the number of students and to numerous discussions on the position of
the universities in society. The rapid growth was of course also caused by
demographic factors and by little concern about the growth of the public
budget.
The new formal organization mainly had two effects. First, it led to
a strong increase in bureaucracy. Second, it gave rise to a situation in
which many people were more involved in the discussions in the various
councils and committees than in the improvement of university education
and research. These effects finally even caused a lack of interest amongz
many. Furthermore, the rapid growth in the number of students and the lack
of concern about the size of the public budget led to a rapid growth in
positions with a tenured track. As a consequence the criteria for hiring
people were not very strict in that period and these people got a per-
manent job. The new democratic organization reinforced this change of
interest within the universities.
In the beginning of the eighties the universities returned to
traditional values. The new system of internal democracy survived, but the
goals of the universities are clearly academic education and research
again. In The Netherlands this return to traditional values was a com-
bination of "top down" and "bottom up" policies. The government took a
number of ineasures which all had the purpose of decreasing the costs of
the uníversities while preserving and strengthening high quality education
and research. At the same time and as a consequence of these measures
highly motivated groups in the universities got more power, and t,hc~y
started to provide the government with ideas for the quality improvement
of the universities. This strategy was very successful. For example, in
the field of economics a sharp increase in research output occurred and
teaching improved, while at the same time the universities suffered from
large budget cuts. Very rough indicators for the teaching output per
guilder and the research output per guilder show an increase by about ~5 x
for both between 1980 and 198~.1 Teaching output is simply defined as
the number oF students taught. An increase in this indicator may of course
be bought at the expense of a drop in the quality of teaching, but the
evaluations of both students and external committees show no signs of
deterioration in the quality of teaching.
The measures of the government can be classified either as rewards
for quality improvement ("carrots") or as punishments for less good per-
formance ("sticks"). Whether or not these measures prove to be successful
highly depends on the internal structure of each university and on the
1 The basis of these calculations can be found in HOOP (1989) and in various
annual reports by universities on the number (weighted or unweighted) of
publications produced annually. The calculations are very rough indeed and ace
only meant to suggest an order of magnitude.3
personal motivation of some of the professors. This can only be analysed
on a micro level for each department separately.
In this paper we first describe in more detail the "carrots" and
"sticks" which the Dutch government invented to revitalize the univer-
sities while cutting costs. After that we will sketch the effects of these
changes in the external environment on internal decision making within a
university. This sketch is pretty much a personal report of our own ex-
perience in the Economics Faculty of Tilburg University. We sum up in the
conclusion.
2. Policy measures
It will not be attempted to give a full explanation of the reasons
for the policy changes. One might say, however, that most of the policy
measures were a conscious attempt to improve the incentive structure for
academic teaching and research at the universities, or to save high
quality teaching and research while bringing down total costs.
Furthermore, the changes were very much the result of explicit decisions
by the top policy makers at the Ministry of Education and Sciences and
were certainly not asked for by the universities. On the contrary, most
policy measures were met with fíerce criticism from the side of the
universities.
a. A new system of university education ("stick")
Until ~982, each student entering a university was working for an
"old style doctorandus" degree. Formally, this could be accomplished in
five years, but in practice it took about seven years on average to get
this degree. The drop out rate was very high, largely because a substan-
tial number oF students never was able to pass the first year's exam. This
is due to the Dutch tradition that everybody can try (there is no entrance
exam), but after one year a serious selection takes place. More impor-
tantly, however, the long stay of the students in the system and the rapid
growth of the number of students entering the system had made it very ex-
pensive. Moreover, it was felt that the lengthy curriculum did not fit in
with the careers of most students. The curriculum often was tailored to
the few students who would go on to write a doctoral thesis, rather than4
to the vast majority who would go on to work for private firms or the
government.
As of September 1982, university education in The Netherlands is or-
ganized in a so-called two-tier system. The first tier of the system lasts
four years and leads to a"new style doctorandus" degree, which is com-
parable with a masters degree. This is the final degree for most students.
Students are allowed to take up to six years to finish this four year
programme. A longer stay in the system is effectively ruled out. The
second tier of the system is a four year doctoral programme for only a
small number of students. The doctoral students are university employees
who are expected to complete a doctoral programme and to provide some
teaching or research assistance in return for a modest salary.
b. Cooperation in doctoral programmes ("carrot")
The new system of university education was launched in september
1982, so that the second tier of the system started for the first time in
1986. The Ministry set aside some money to give start-up grants to
initiatives for cooperation in joint doctoral programmes. The form of
these programmes was left to the profession. In economics, two different
initiatives received a five year subsidy from the government. The Erasmus
University (Rotterdam), the University of Amsterdam and the Free
University (Amsterdam) established the "Tinbergen Institute", which is a
research institute, responsible for the doctoral students in economics and
business administration at those three universities. A very different set-
up is provided by the "Network Quantitatíve Economics", which is an
association of mainly economic theorists and econometricians of all Dutch
universities, offering a formal curriculum and supervision. In contrast to
the Tinbergen Institute, the Network covers all universities, but on the
other hand it only covers part of economics. Next to these organizations
there exist others which did not receive a subsidy, but which nevertheless
provide similar services. In particular, there exist several other net-
works providing doctoral courses in subdisciplines of economics. Currently
there is a movement towards integration of the various organizations into
one comprehensive system of national doctoral training. Clearly, there are
many advantages to having nationally organized doctoral programmes. The
expertise of the best people of all universities can be drawn upon for
courses as well as supervision, and a wide variety of doctoral courses can5
be offered in an efficient manner. The possibility to exploit these ad-
vantages is very much given by the geographical concentration of the
universities in The Netherlands.
c. Conditional finance of research CFR ("carrot"~"stick")
Until 1982, universities were basically financed on the basis of num-
bers of students. Where faculty members were supposed to spend about half
of their time on research, the research capacity of a university pretty
much followed the number of students. This system did not create any
financial incentive for the university to attract good researchers, since
research output was almost irrelevant for the university budget. In 1982
the Ministry introduced an evaluation scheme for university research. A
part of the budget for university research was set aside and the univer-
sities were told that they could only get this money on the condition that
they had enough approved research programmes. Researchers had to formulate
five-year research programmes which were evaluated by external referees.
In principle, the idea was that, if a university had not enough approved
research programmes to cover their existing research input, their budget
was cut. In that case the budget of other universities which had more than
enough approved research programmes could actually grow. This reallocation
of resources on the basis of external evaluations has not fully
materialized yet, partly because of heavy protests from the side of the
universities. Nevertheless, the potential threat of loosing money due to
the negative evaluation of research programmes stimulated the universities
to take the quality control of their research much more seriously than
before. In ~986, these CFR programmes constituted about ~5 x of the
resources for university research.
d. Budget cuts ("stick")
Both in 1982 and in 1986, when a new government took office, univer-
sity budgets were cut. The size of the cuts was rather limited as compared
to the total size of the budget. In 1982 Dfl. 258 million was cut and in
~986 Dfl. 130 million. The total budget for all universities combined in
both years was in the order of Dfl. 3.5 billion. More importantly,
however, the Ministry intended not to use the "cheeseslicer" (typical
Dutch instrument) for all departments, but to close down some departments
completely. In econo~ics, for example, it was announced in 1982 that oF
the five departments of econometrics in The Netherlands only two would6
survive. The argument for this case was the low number of students, but in
other fields also a lack of quality could be the reason to close down a
department. Committees were set up to evaluate the different departments
and to make recommendations about the implementation of the budget cuts.
Under storms of protest from the side of the universities many oF these
plans never materialized and one mainly resorted to the cheeseslicer
again. For instance, none of the econometrics departments was shut down.
However, it had become clear once and for all that a university job was no
longer secure forever, and that departments that were unsuccessful in one
way or another could go under.
e. Change oF salary scales ("carrot"~"stick")
In the beginning of the eighties the salary composition of the
faculty members was top-heavy. The majority of the faculty members had
been appointed during the rapid expansion in the sixties and early
seventies. Because in that period money was ample, these people were
placed in high salary scales with guarantees for a steady increase in
salary. Money beceme less ample and after 19~8 faculty members were ap-
pointed in lower salary scales with a slower growth. Since selection
during the big expansion had not been very strict, a sharp contrast arose
between, on the one hand, a large group of middle-aged less productive
faculty members with a high salary and, on the other hand, a small group
of young productive faculty members with a low salary and little career
prospects. Furthermore, increases in salary were only dependent on
seniority and not on performance. This situation made it also very dif-
ficult for the universities to hire new personnel and to compete with
private enterprises for the bright young people. The Ministry introduced a
new system of university ranks with very strict rules for promotion. The
new ranks were assistant professor, associate professor, full professor,
where ín the full professor rank two salary scales were distinguished ("A"
and "B"). Every faculty member had to be placed in one of the new ranks.
Because the number of full and associate professorships was limited, the
total wage bill of the universities was also reduced and this released
funds to create new incentives.
f. [~c,s t -d~~~~ gran ~s ( "carrot" )7
Since 198~, the Ministry made a small part of the money saved by the
budget cuts available again for university research in the form of post-
doc grants. Although the salary scales were changed, it remained difficult
to recruit the bright young doctorates for a university career. These
post-doc grants are meant to employ young researchers for three or five
years. The incentive for them is that they can do full-time research at
good salaries. Each year about fifty grants are awarded. On average about
two or three of these are awarded to researchers in economics. Although
these numbers are relatively modest, incentives are created for the
departments to find people who can be nominated. Departments do not only
get these researchers for free, but having a number of these luxurious
post-doc grants in a department is also a sign of quality which can be
used in other applications for extra research money, or to get around new
budget cuts.
g. External evaluation of teaching ("stick")
Since i988, the Ministry sees to the evaluation of the university
curricula by national committees of independent experts (for example,
Dutch scholars who are working abroad serve on these committees). The
evaluation takes place once every five years and involves extensive fact
finding. The result of the evaluation is published, so that this judgement
on the performance in education of each department may influence its
reputation and, hence, the inflow of students. Since the university budget
is strongly related to the number of students, it can be expected that the
universities will take the quality control of teaching and the design of
curricula very seriously. For economics, the first evaluation takes place
in 1990.
h. External evaluation of research in economics ("stick")
In 1985, a fact findíng committee, set up by the Ministry, published
a report on the profile and productivity of research in economics at the
Dutch universities. The general conclusion was that the research output
was far too low, especially in journals with an international exposure,
and that economic theory received relatively little attention. The fin-
dings varied of course over the subdisciplines. Econometrics came out a5
the most successful field, whereas for business administration the ten-
tative conclusion was that little research was going on.
i. Centres of excellence ("carrot")8
On top of the elaborate system of quality control and incentives the
Ministry sometimes also allocates seed money for the founding of so-called
"centres of excellence" in certain fields. In economics such is a center
is the Center for Economic Research (CentER) at Tilburg University. It is
a matching fund set-up with a university to create a stimulating environ-
ment without too many restrictions in order to breed excellent research.
3. How it works in practice
For most of the eighties, we were both members of the econometrics
department of the Faculty of Economics at Tilburg University. The Faculty
has about 125 members and approximately 4000 students of economics,
business administration, econometrics and information management.
In the Spring oF 1982 the Ministry announced that the department of
econometrics (which includes mathematical economics, management science
and operations research) of Tilburg University had to close down, because
the number of students was too small. A concerted lobbying and publicity
effort prevented this, partly because the decision makers could be con-
vinced that econometrics was in many respects the most successful part of
Dutch economics. Despite the happy ending, most of the members of our
econometrics department came to the important conclusion that no one was
save anymore from loosing a job. Raising the number of students by good
teaching and improving the quality of research was identified as the main
safeguard against new unpleasant surprises. It is interesting to note that
presumably due to the publicity about this issue the number of students in
econometrics tripled in a few years after the threatening announcement
(this happened nationwide).
In 1985 the committee for the evaluation of economic research in The
Netherlands published its report. It was very critical of the quality and
scope of economic research in our country. Still some universities fared
better than others. Especially Tilburg University came out badly. The
report was taken very seriously by the university administration and by
parts of the F'aculty. More or less at the same time the restructuring of
salary scales took place and difficult decisions had to be made as to who
was worthy of the few prizes that could be awarded. The threat of9
unpleasant surprises at new rounds of budget cuts and the unfavourable
report by the fact finding committee were enough for the university ad-
ministrators and the main decision makers within the Faculty to decide
that quality should be the decisive criterion for the better positions,
and not seniority. This is less obvious as it may seem, which can be
concluded from the fact that certainly not all universities adopted this
stance. Some of the more senior faculty members, who were effectively
demoted to assistant professors as a conseyuence of this procedure,
decided to leave. They found employment in private enterprises or in
universities that had decided to weigh quality less heavily. In addition,
our department of econometrics succeeded in convincing the board of the
university that this was a golden opportunity to attract good young
faculty members from universities where seniority was given priority. As a
result of this the econometrics department hired two young promising as-
sociate professors who had missed out on the desirable positions at their
own institution. All this took heavy lobbying by a few motivated in-
dividuals, but clearly they would not have stood a chance if the
university policy makers had not realized the seriousness of external
threats and the importance of having high quality faculty members as a
safeguard.
Tilburg University rigorously adopted the national system of con-
ditional finance of research (CFR) as a basis for the allocation of
research budgets between the faculties. The department of econometrics
benefited to a great extent, because it was the first within the Faculty
of Economics to realize the opportunities offered by the new system and
because it had quite a few good research groups. In the beginning the
Faculty as a whole was relatively slow in developing enough consistent
research programmes and as a result it lost a substantial part of its
budget to faculties which had been quicker in understanding the principle.
Currently, the Faculty is regaining ground and as a consequence the
research budget of the Faculty is increasing. The competition within the
university for the research funds is becoming fiercer every year. As a
result of this, good researchers become more valuable every year and,
hence, both their salary and their influence increase.
The new two-tier system of university education required the develop-
ment of ideas on the form of the doctoral programmes. The experience in10
the U.K. and the U.S.A. learned that a department could not afford to miss
out on this. Because it was felt that it could eventually prove to be dif-
ficult to sustain a strong doctoral programme all by itself, some members
oF our department joined forces with colleagues in other departments in
the country to cooperate in a joint doctoral programme in quantitative
economics. The Network Quantitative Economics was established and it
received a start-up grant from the Ministry. As of September 1986 the
Network provides supervision and organizes a formal curriculum for doc-
toral students in quantitative economics of all universities in which the
best researchers from inside and outside the couiitry are teaching courses.
Many members of the Faculty of Economics were not very enthousiastic
about the changes that took place. Many "certainties" of the sixties and
the seventies turned out to be very uncertain indeed, and the career
prospects of quite a few faculty members lost much of their brightness
under the new rules of the game. Certainly in the early eighties, the
rather agressive econometrics department was considered by the other
departments in the Faculty as a pain in the neck. Gradually it was
realized, however, that many of the changes were inevitable in the rapidly
changing external environment and the tension eased a bit. In the process
of change, the students have played an important role. As was indicated in
the introduction, many strategic decisions are taken by the various
councils in which all groups are represented. More and more the students
turned out to act as impartial decision makers who could break the balance
of power between the representatives of the various parties.
4. Conclusion
Although quite a few of the measures described were never fully
implemented, because of the strong resistance on the part of the univer-
sities, the whole atmosphere definitely changed over the last decade. The
Dutch universities have become better prepared to compete and cooperate
with other European universities in a united Europe.
Many of the policy measures taken are of the carrot type. The extent
to which these measures work appears to depend quite a bit on the presence11
of motivated individuals within a university. Where the presence or ab-
sence of such individuals in any given organization is often a matter of
chance, the final effect of many of the measures may vary a great deal
across universities.
Another aspect of the measures taken is that almost all of them were
directed at a change in the external environment in which the uníversities
have to operate. The internal organisation of the universities has hardly
been altered. However, the new external environment has made quality so
much more important in the minds of university decision makers that the
informal power structure has shifted substantially in the direction of the
profession.
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